In a global landscape increasingly marked by complex crises and shifting power dynamics, the role of foreign assistance in conflict and stabilization is changing. Andrew Sinclair, a Senior Technical Advisor at Dexis and a seasoned expert in security and foreign assistance, shares his insights on strategies to prioritize both immediate needs and sustainable peace.
Q: What initially drew you to security and foreign assistance work?
Andrew: Like many, I was shaped by the events of 9/11 and the resulting U.S. foreign policy shifts in the early 2000s. This led to an interest in the Middle East, then UN peacekeeping, and only later with USAID working alongside U.S. military in southeastern Afghanistan focused on counterinsurgency. I then joined USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) and became the Country Representative for Syria and Libya. In many ways my career has followed the arc and evolution of U.S. foreign policy during the global war on terrorism, the Arab Spring response, and the counter Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) campaign.
Q: How would you describe the current global security environment?
Andrew: We’re in a new—and yet undefined—era characterized by multipolarity, declining trust in institutions, and a diffuse information environment that complicates and often hinders international cooperation and consensus necessary to resolve, let alone manage, conflicts. As compound conflicts like Syria and Libya may become the norm rather than the exception, assistance must be flexible, adaptive, and linked to diplomatic and defense lines of effort. It must also be elevated in the policy formulation and implementation phases. Without this, we risk underutilizing one of the best tools we have to achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives. Foreign assistance is not charity. It’s an investment in U.S. national security.
Q: What are some of the lessons you’ve learned from your work with OTI?
Andrew: First, assistance programs must be a part of—not an afterthought to—diplomatic objectives. To do this, U.S. assistance must calibrate to each context, which requires flexibility, risk-taking, and intensive management to tailor work that is both responsive to policy and the situation on the ground. For example, in northeastern Syria, OTI supported groups of citizens to ensure they were brought into the post-ISIS transition. This resulted in us supporting a community group to rehabilitate a traffic circle in the center of Raqqa city that was previously used by ISIS for public executions and beheadings. Shortly after the project was completed, young newlywed couples began posing in the circle for wedding photos. By empowering locals to take their city back, a monument of ISIS terror was transformed into a symbol of new love.
Second, we need to elevate assistance as a tool to influence the trajectories of countries where the U.S. is understandably taking a limited role. Gone are the days of large Afghanistan- and Iraq-style military interventions with massive development budgets for reconstruction. Instead, we must lead with nimble programs that complement U.S. diplomacy and military efforts and act as a force multiplier for other donor initiatives. In Libya, OTI’s work in Sirte laid the foundations not just for post-ISIS recovery but also provided the environment for hosting the joint military commission comprised of previously warring sides overseeing Libya’s nationwide ceasefire. Our local partners readied the city in advance of the vote of confidence for the new Government of National Unity. This demonstrates the catalytic role assistance can have in setting the conditions for political compromise. It shows we can do a lot with a little.
Third, we shouldn’t overstate the impact of assistance in the absence of policy clarity or political will. Assistance cannot be a crutch when policy falls short. For too long, many of our partners in Syria viewed U.S. assistance as a statement of political will for the opposition. This risked creating the moral hazard of partners continuing their work as the Syrian regime and Russians attacked them with impunity. OTI assistance to the White Helmets helped them saved over 100,000 lives, but it also came at the cost of over 300 volunteers who were killed in line of duty.
Q: How do you see the U.S. government’s approach to foreign assistance in conflict settings evolving in the next decade?
Andrew: Trust and partnership—key ingredients for successful programming anywhere—are particularly important in conflict settings where violence often breaks the social fabric among and between communities caught in conflict. As the military theorist Carl von Clausewitz stated, “war is the continuation of politics by other means.” This is commonplace in our understanding of how wars begin.
However, in post-conflict, fragile contexts where fighting has ended and a political process to resolve it is pursued, policymakers and stabilization programs must also view Clausewitz’s observation in reverse, since conflicting parties may continue their “war through political means.” Transforming leaders fighting for power into politicking for power is the goal of conflict resolution, as is incentivizing actors to pursue non-violent means of achieving their aims. In my experience this can be achieved by combining diplomatic, security, and foreign assistance efforts in a holistic manner to reduce the incentives perpetuating the warring sides to fight. I often say, “you cannot fight, talk, or spend your way out of conflict.” You must combine all three to achieve durable peace.
Andrew Sinclair
Andrew Sinclair leads strategy and thought leadership across security and foreign assistance portfolios at Dexis. With expertise in operating in complex conflict environments, including work with USAID’s OTI, Andrew has been instrumental in advancing conflict prevention and stabilization efforts. His research on multilateral peace operations and experience working with the U.S. government make him a driving force in shaping security programs globally.
